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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AFTER
BUSTOS V. HYUNDAI : UJI 13-1407 AND THE
“REQUIREMENT” TO SHOW REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS IN AUTOMOBILE
CRASH CASES
Anand S. Chellappa*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bustos v. Hyundai,1 the New Mexico Court of Appeals reaffirmed
its holding in Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp.2 that tort claims arising from
an automobile’s lack of crashworthiness can be based on strict product
liability. In affirming Brooks’ “unreasonable risk of injury” test, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff in this case was not required
to prove the feasibility of a reasonable alternative design as requested by
Defendant. The court ruled that a jury could examine risk-benefit consid-
erations using UJI 13-1407 NMRA and affirmed the jury award of $4.2
million to Plaintiff.
Neither Brooks nor Bustos, however, provide an answer for how a
trial court should take into account the seven risk-benefit factors listed in
the Committee Commentary of UJI 13-1407. A showing of reasonable
alternative designs is one of these seven factors. Brooks held that a plain-
tiff is not “required” to prove that reasonable alternative designs were
available and that the defendant did not implement them. But say in a
given case that the other six factors are irrelevant or neutral to both par-
ties’ cases: if the showing of reasonable alternative designs is the factor
left standing, would this not require a plaintiff to make its case based on
this factor?
In an effort to answer this question, this note applies the risk-benefit
factors to the facts of Bustos. The note concludes that three of the seven
factors are irrelevant to the case, one relates to causation and its fit in
* Ph.D. (Chemical Engineering), University of Missouri-Columbia; Class of
2014, University of New Mexico School of Law. Thanks to Mr. David J. Jaramillo,
Plaintiff’s attorney, for providing an introduction to this case and a copy of the briefs
submitted to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
1. Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090, 149 N.M. 1, 243 P.3d 440,
cert. quashed, No. 32,534 (June 5, 2012).
2. Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1995-NMSC-043, 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54.
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proving design defect is questionable, one is neutral to both parties, and
one favors Defendant. This note submits that the seventh factor—a show-
ing of reasonable alternative designs—was necessary to prove design de-
fect in Bustos. Next, this note examines the burdens of proof the Bustos
court placed on Plaintiff and Defendant. Bustos places a low burden on
the plaintiff to show reasonable alternative designs. In contrast, Defen-
dant (a manufacturer with deep pockets) is faced with a high burden to
disprove the feasibility of Plaintiff’s alternative designs.
Finally, to streamline the uniform application of UJI 13-1407, this
note recommends that courts explicitly weigh risk-benefit considerations
during trial. Additionally, this note presents an amended version of UJI
13-1407 for consideration. In the meantime, defendant product manufac-
turers should appreciate that the plaintiff’s showing of reasonable alter-
native design is part of UJI 13-1407 while also taking note of Bustos’s
burden requirement, which has the appearance of burden shifting under-
pinned by policy.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On a Sunday morning in July 2004, Marcos (Lee) Baca, a twenty-
one-year-old student at New Mexico State University, and his fiance´e
were driving to Santa Teresa in a 2002 Hyundai Accent. His fiance´e, who
was driving, lost control of the vehicle. The vehicle veered off the road-
way, rolled over three-and-one-half times, and came to rest on its roof.
Mr. Baca, who was riding in the front passenger seat, was killed in the
accident.3
His fiance´e, however, was able to walk away.4 The Office of the New
Mexico Medical Examiner found that positional asphyxia caused Mr.
Baca’s death because his body was stuck in such a way that the “vehicle
weighed down against his head and neck and compressed his chin into his
chest.”5
“When the driver lost control, the [car] was traveling at a speed of
approximately sixty-four miles per hour, but . . . had slowed down to be-
tween thirty-two and thirty-four miles per hour by the time it began to
roll over.”6 “[T]he roof over the passenger seat crushed downward and
inward[, and] the roof rail dropped down vertically to the top of the pas-
senger seat headrest[,] and horizontally[,] such that approximately half of
3. This version of the facts drawn from the brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1,
Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090, No. 28,240 (2010).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 6, 149 N.M. 1.
6. Id. ¶ 3.
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the headrest extended outside the plane of the side window.”7 Conse-
quently, “the A-pillar, which connects the front of the door frame along
the windshield to the roof rail, had crushed 10.9 inches[,] and the B-pillar,
which connects the back of the door frame to the roof rail, had crushed
10.8 inches.”8 The “roof above the driver’s side of the Accent was not as
severely deformed.”9 With the vehicle upside down, Mr. Baca was “buck-
led into his safety belt in the passenger seat,” but his “head was outside
the passenger side window[,] and [rested] atop a CD changer, which had
become dislodged from the vehicle.”10
Art Bustos, on behalf of Mr. Baca’s estate, and survivors (“Plaintiff”
and “Appellee”), brought suit against Hyundai Motor Company, Hy-
undai Motor America, and Borman Motor Company (“Defendant” and
“Appellant”) for “negligence, [breach of] implied warranty, and strict
products liability, asserting that the roof structure of the car was defec-
tively designed.”11 Plaintiff relied on expert testimony to establish (1) the
existence of a design defect in the car, and (2) the causation link between
the design defect and the injury enhancement of death.12 John Stilson, an
automotive and safety consultant, examined the vehicle four times along
with Hyundai representatives.13 He testified that, as a result of defective
roof design,14 the passenger “survival space within the Accent was re-
duced to below what would be necessary for rollover protection.”15 In
addition, Joseph Burton, a forensic pathology and forensic medical con-
sultant, “explained that merely hanging upside down in the vehicle would
not have caused Mr. Baca to asphyxiate.”16 He testified that Mr. Baca’s
body was “forced into compression . . . resulting in Mr. Baca’s head being
placed outside of the vehicle and on top of the CD changer.”17 The result-
ing compression of his rib cage impaired Mr. Baca’s regular breathing.
7. Id. ¶ 4.
8. Id. For a technical analysis of rollover impact on the occupants of a vehicle,
see Brief of Defendants-Appellants at Exhibit B, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-
NMCA-090 (No. 28,240) (James Raddin, Joseph Cormier, Brian Smyth, Jeffrey
Croteau & Eddie Cooper, Compressive Neck Injury and its Relationship to Head Con-
tact and Torso Motion During Vehicle Rollovers, SAE Technical Paper 2009-01-0829,
(2009)).
9. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 5, 149 N.M. 1.
10. Id.
11. Id. ¶ 1.
12. Id. ¶ 7.
13. Id. ¶ 18.
14. Id. ¶ 23.
15. Id. ¶ 7.
16. Id. ¶ 8.
17. Id.
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Dr. Burton testified that Mr. Baca died from “positional asphyxiation
caused by the condition the vehicle put his body in when it came to rest.18
Plaintiff argued that although the vehicle did not cause the crash or
the rollover, “defects in the car’s door and roof designs caused enhanced
injuries distinct from those caused by the crash.”19 On the other hand,
Defendant used undisputed expert testimony to show that “the 2002 Ac-
cent had a roof strength equal to 3.2 times its curb weight—far in excess
of the 1.5 [factor] required by the [National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (“NHTSA”)] standard.”20 The jury, however, found in favor
of Plaintiff on all claims and awarded Plaintiff $4.2 million.21 The district
court entered judgment on the verdict and denied Defendant’s motion
for post-trial judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial or
remittur under Rule 1-059 NMRA.22
On appeal, Defendant argued that Plaintiff “sought to fill critical
gaps in the proof of their claims with expert testimony that created a
vague impression that [D]efendant bears some responsibility for the inju-
ries” that led to Mr. Baca’s death.23 Defendant stated that the Accent
“satisfies, and in many cases far exceeds all pertinent federal safety stan-
dards [for door latch mechanisms and roof strength] imposed by
[NHTSA].”24 Defendant argued that (1) the district court abused its dis-
cretion in admitting expert testimony as to the design defect and en-
hanced injury; (2) Plaintiff failed to prove that a design defect caused the
enhanced injury; and (3) the district court erred as a matter of law by
failing to specifically instruct the jury that Plaintiff was required to prove
the feasibility of a reasonable alternative design that could have elimi-
nated the alleged defect.25 The court of appeals addressed each argument
and ultimately affirmed the district court’s judgment.26 The New Mexico
Supreme Court initially granted certiorari on October 18, 2010; it
quashed certiorari on June 5, 2012.27
18. Id.
19. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 3, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-
NMCA-090, No. 28,240 (2010).
20. Id. at 5.
21. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 1, 149 N.M. 1.
22. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 12, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-
NMCA-090, No. 28,240 (2010).
23. Id. at 1.
24. Id. at 4. See also id. at 4–5 (discussing relevant NHTSA safety standards).
25. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 9, 149 N.M. 1.
26. Id.
27. 2012-NMCERT-006 (No. 32,534, June 5, 2012).
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III. BACKGROUND
This case note examines the rationale and impact of the court’s
holding that in a New Mexico strict products liability suit, a plaintiff is not
required to prove the feasibility of a reasonable alternative design. The
court rejected Defendant’s argument that New Mexico should adopt the
Restatement (Third) of Torts28 by requiring a plaintiff to prove that the
defendant failed to implement a reasonable alternative safer design.29 The
court found that Defendant’s argument conflicted with New Mexico
law.30 Following Brooks,31 the court affirmed the policy that UJI 13-1407
“adequately and correctly conveyed the applicable legal standard” in
New Mexico.32 According to the definition of “unreasonable risk of in-
jury” in UJI 13-1407, “consideration of alternate designs is but one of
several risk-benefit considerations that a jury may balance in determining
whether a product created an unreasonable risk of injury.”33 The court
found that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s request because
Defendant “misstated the test for a design defect by focusing the jury too
narrowly on a reasonable alternative design.”34 The court followed
Brooks, and stated that it had no authority to amend UJI 13-1407.35 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Restatement (Second) of Torts to require courts to use UJI 13-
1407 in every strict products liability case.36
28. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 50, 149 N.M. 1. States (minority) that have
adopted sections of the Restatement (Third) of Torts include Iowa, New Jersey,
Rhode Island and Wisconsin. See Spencer H. Silvergate, The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability-The Tension Between Product Design and Product Warnings,
75 FLA. B. J. 10, 17 n.34 (2001); Heather M. Bessinger & Nathaniel Cade, Jr., Who’s
Afraid of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, (posted Sep. 17, 2010), available at http://
wislawjournal.com/2010/09/17/whos-afraid-of-the-restatement-third-of-torts/.
29. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 57, 149 N.M. 1.
30. Id. ¶¶ 51–57 (citing Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, 120 N.M. 372).
31. In Brooks, the wife of an airline pilot who was killed in a plane crash in 1988
sued Beech Aircraft based on negligence and strict liability for an alleged design de-
fect. Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶ 1, 120 N.M. 372. She claimed that the absence of a
shoulder harness caused her husband’s death. Id. The trial court granted defendant
manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment. Id. On appeal, the supreme court re-
versed and remanded. Id. The court held that a design-defect claim may be proved
without showing that the manufacturer violated standards applicable to the plane that
was manufactured in 1968. Id.
32. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 52, 149 N.M. 1.
33. Id. ¶ 54.
34. Id.
35. Id. ¶ 55.
36. Id. (citing Supreme Court Order No. 09-8300-011).
33996-nm
x_44-1 Sheet No. 111 Side B      02/06/2014   10:11:19
33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 111 Side B      02/06/2014   10:11:19
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX106.txt unknown Seq: 6  4-FEB-14 14:06
212 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
IV. RATIONALE
The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s re-
quested jury instruction for reviewing strict products liability design de-
fects in New Mexico. The instruction in question was based on the
Restatement (Third) of Torts and required Plaintiff to make a specific
showing of a reasonable alternative design in strict products liability de-
sign defect cases:
A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of dis-
tribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.
. . .
The test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at rea-
sonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable harm posed by the
product and if so, whether the omission of the alternative design
by the seller rendered the product not reasonably safe.37
Citing Morales,38 Defendant argued that New Mexico courts had favora-
bly viewed sections of the Restatement (Third) of Torts on strict products
liability law.39 Defendant wanted a jury instruction that required a “spe-
cific showing of a reasonable alternative design in strict products liability
design defect cases.”40 Defendant suggested that an alternative design
would serve as a benchmark against which the jury could compare the
alleged defective design while conducting the risk-benefit analysis New
Mexico law requires.41
The Bustos court distinguished Morales by pointing out that Morales
only requires a plaintiff to propose an alternative design when the plain-
tiff’s case in chief depends solely on “criticiz[ing] a product[.]”42 The court
37. Id. ¶ 50 (emphasis added).
38. In Morales, the plaintiff was injured by an asphalt distributor machine.
Morales v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1279 (D.N.M. 2005). Plaintiff
sued manufacturer, claiming that the product was unreasonably dangerous for its in-
tended purpose, pointing to four design defects and offering five solutions. Id. The
jury returned verdict for the defendant manufacturer, finding no defect in the ma-
chine. Id. at 1280.
39. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 56, 149 N.M. 1 (citing Morales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at
1283–84 (D.N.M. 2005)).
40. Id. ¶ 50. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2 (1998).
41. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 50, 149 N.M. 1.
42. Id. ¶ 57.
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then added that Plaintiff here had done “more than merely criticize the
design of the Accent’s roof structure.”43 The court noted that Plaintiff had
used expert testimony to identify alternatives that would prove to be
safer in a rollover and prevent enhanced injuries such as Mr. Baca’s
death.44
The court stated that an enhanced injury is “that portion of damage
or injury caused by the design defect over and above that which would
have resulted from the original accident had the vehicle not been defec-
tive.”45 The court concluded that the concern Morales identified did not
exist in this case and said “[u]nder New Mexico law, the existence of a
reasonable alternative design is a relevant consideration by a jury . . .
[but] a specific finding on this issue is not required.”46
The court turned to Brooks to guide its decision. In Brooks, the
New Mexico Supreme Court declared that a “defect giving rise to strict
products liability is not measured by comparison with a prototype.”47 The
Court noted that the “unreasonable risk of injury” test in UJI 13-1407
would allow an “argument under any rational theory of defect” instead of
being solely dependent on the considerations of reasonable alternative
designs.48
Under UJI 13-1407, when a plaintiff asserts that the product’s design
presents an unreasonable risk of injury, the jury should examine the
product at the time of the injury and not at the time of manufacture.49
The Bustos court explained:
An unreasonable risk of injury is a risk which a reasonably pru-
dent person having full knowledge of the risk would find unaccept-
able. This means that a product does not present an unreasonable
risk of injury simply because it is possible to be harmed by it.
[The design of a product need not necessarily adopt features
which represent the ultimate in safety. You should consider the
ability to eliminate the risk without seriously impairing the useful-
ness of the product or making it unduly expensive.]
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. ¶ 28 (citing Duran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1983-NMCA-121, 101 N.M. 742,
749–50, 688 P.2d 779, 786–87, overruled on other grounds by Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043,
120 N.M. 372).
46. Id. ¶ 54.
47. Id. (citing Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, 120 N.M. 372) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. ¶ 53.
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Under products liability law, you are not to consider the reasona-
bleness of acts or omissions of the supplier. You are to look at the
product itself and consider only the risks of harm from its condi-
tion or from the manner of its use at the time of the injury. [The
question for you is whether the product was defective, even
though the supplier could not have known of such risks at the time
of supplying the product.]50
Following Brooks, the court listed seven risk-benefit factors that a jury
may balance in determining whether a product created an unreasonable
risk of injury:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product;
(2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same
need;
(3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, i.e.,
“risk”;
(4) the obviousness of the danger;
(5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the
danger (particularly for established products);
(6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (in-
cluding the effect of instructions or warnings); and
(7) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impair-
ing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly
expensive.51
The court noted that a jury may consider alternate designs as part of the
seventh factor.52 In accordance with Brooks, the court of appeals in Bus-
tos found that the lower court properly rejected Defendant’s proposed
jury instruction because it focused too narrowly on a reasonable alternate
design requirement.53
Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s briefs did not weigh the evidence in
terms of the risk-benefit factors to compel a finding that supports their
respective arguments. One can summarize the issue in question as fol-
lows: Defendant believed that the unreasonable risk of injury test should
boil down to a single requirement that Plaintiff must show that a reasona-
ble and safer alternative design was available and that Defendant failed
to adopt this design. Defendant implied, that in the absence of this re-
quirement, a strict product liability claim in New Mexico would, by de-
fault, favor Plaintiff. On the other hand, Plaintiff argued that the
50. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
51. Id. ¶ 54 (citing Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, 120 N.M. 372).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
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balancing test Brooks advocated must stand but did not apply the facts to
the test. The court agreed with Plaintiff and noted that Plaintiff had used
expert testimony to prove that a “safer alternate design” was available.
Does this mean that the Plaintiff had met the requirement that Defen-
dant wanted?
Brooks held that a plaintiff does not need to produce evidence of an
alternate design in order to make a design defect claim, and expressly
approved UJI 13-407’s broader risk-benefit calculation.54 Brooks and UJI
13-1407, however, both allow the jury to consider evidence of an alterna-
tive design as a factor in determining whether a product presents an “un-
reasonable risk of injury.”55 Additionally, Brooks stated that New Mexico
does not subscribe to the consumer expectation test56 or to the risk-utility
test57 in evaluating whether a product is defective but, instead, allows
“proof and argument under any rational theory.”58 With the supreme
court quashing certiorari in this case, manufacturers may think twice
about doing business in New Mexico because the State’s policy-driven
strict liability practice59 appears to favor a plaintiff by default.60 To chal-
54. Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶ 32, 120 N.M. 372.
55. Id. ¶ 35; UJI 13-1407 NMRA, annot. (emphasis added).
56. Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 120 N.M. 372. The consumer expectation test
is described as follows: A “product is not defectively dangerous ‘[i]f the average con-
sumer would reasonably and fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury.’” BES-
SINGER & CADE, supra note 28 (citing Vincer v. Williams All-Aluminum Swimming R
Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1975)).
57. “The risk-utility test finds a product defective as designed only if the magni-
tude of the risk created by the design is greater than the utility of the product.” BES-
SINGER & CADE, supra note 28. “Under the risk-utility test, the plaintiff need only R
show that the design of the product was the proximate cause of his injury, and the
burden then shifts to the product manufacturer to demonstrate that the benefits of the
particular design outweigh the risks.” Id.
58. Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 120 N.M. 372 (explaining that the unreasona-
ble-risk-of-injury test is flexible enough to accomodate other theories such as the con-
sumer expectations test, risk-utility test, and defect-is-defect test). See also infra notes
65–66.
59. See Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 13–23, 120 N.M. 372 (explaining four pri-
mary policies that underpin strict products liability in New Mexico). I have intention-
ally couched my observations and comments using indefinite words such as “seem”
and “appears to.” I do not intend this article to be a thesis on products liability or tort
law. I point out that the current UJI 13-1407 is “wishy-washy,” under the guise of
flexibility, and recommend clarification and fair application to both plantiffs and
defendants.
60. New Mexico practice breeds the type of legal uncertainty that discourages
businesses from locating in New Mexico. See Brief for Association of Commerce and
Industry as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 15, Bustos v. Hyundai
Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090, No. 28,240 (2010). See also infra Part VI.
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lenge the validity of this perception, this note applies the risk-benefit fac-
tors to the facts of Bustos. This note then examines the issue of burden
shifting, whereby a defendant would have to “convincingly” demonstrate
that a plaintiff’s reasonable alternative designs are not feasible and calls
for systematic applications of the unreasonable risk-of-injury test. Finally,
it demonstrates that in strict product liability automobile crash cases, such
as the instant case, a plaintiff would be hard-pressed to convince a jury
without some evidence that a “reasonable alternative design” was availa-
ble and that the defendant did not employ it in the product.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Under the seven risk-benefit factors listed in the commentary of UJI-
1407, the “unreasonable risk of injury” test required Plaintiff to show a
reasonable alternative design to prove that the 2002 Accent’s roof was
defective.
This note explores the risk-benefit factors listed in the commentary
of UJI 13-1407 below. Although analysis in hindsight on how a jury might
have decided if it had weighed the risk-benefit factors is tricky business,
the author has tried to remain objective in applying these factors. Moreo-
ver, analyzing the factors within the context of Bustos helps illustrate how
trial courts can make the application of New Mexico products liability law
more consistent and predictable in future cases. The reader can decide
whether the result in Bustos can be explained as resulting from tactical
choices made by Defendant, or from an inherent unfriendliness to de-
fendants in products liability actions in New Mexico.
1. The Usefulness and Desirability of the Product
The committee commentary for UJI 13-1407 indicates that a jury
should examine this factor against UJI 13-1419 NMRA for “unavoidably
unsafe products”:
There are some products which, even when properly prepared and
labeled, cannot be made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
Because of the nature of ingredients or natural characteristics of
the products, use of these products involves substantial risk of in-
jury, and some users will necessarily be harmed. Such products are
said to be unavoidably unsafe.
Unless the product unreasonably exposes users to risk of injury,
there is no liability for supplying an unavoidably unsafe product.
Whether users are unreasonably exposed to risk of injury turns
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upon a balancing of the dangers and benefits resulting from the
product’s use.61
The use note for UJI 13-1419 states:
This instruction must be given only in cases in which the generic
condition of the product gives rise to the risk of injury, for exam-
ple, certain chemicals and drugs. The risk arises from the nature of
the product and not from inadequacies of design, manufacture or
labeling. It shall be used only where the plaintiff presents suffi-
cient evidence that the product’s hazardous characteristics are of
such magnitude that the product should not have been put in the
channels of commerce. Applicability of the instruction is further
limited by the requirement that the injury result from an intended
use of the product.62
This factor therefore applies only to inherently and unavoidably unsafe
products. The product in this case is an automobile. An “automobile is
not an inherently dangerous article.”63 Therefore, this factor is not rele-
vant to this case.
2. The Availability of Other and Safer Products to Meet the Same
Need
The committee comment for UJI 13-1407 indicates that one should
examine this factor against UJI 13-140864 for strict liability–evidence:
Under the “products liability” claim, what is customarily done by
those engaged in the supplier’s business is evidence of whether a
risk of injury would be acceptable to a reasonably prudent person.
However, the acceptability of a risk of injury is determined by the
conduct of a reasonably prudent person having full knowledge of
the risk, whether such conduct is usually followed or not.
Compliance with [industry [customs] [standards] [codes] [rules__
[or] [governmental [rules] [standards] [codes__ is evidence of the
acceptability of the risk, but it is not conclusive.65
This inquiry involves two steps: (1) supplier’s compliance with codes and
standards; and (2) a reasonably prudent person’s conduct in view of this
compliance and knowledge of the associated risk. With regard to the first
61. UJI 13-1419 (emphasis added).
62. UJI 13-1419 (use note) (emphasis added).
63. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 384, 111 N.E. 1050, 1051
(1916).
64. See UJI 13-1407 comm. cmt.
65. UJI 13-1408 NMRA (emphasis added).
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step, Defendant’s undisputed evidence showed that the 2002 Hyundai
Accent’s door latch mechanism was “in full compliance” with Standard
206, a federal safety standard that the NHTSA imposes for door-latch
mechanisms.66 Defendant also established through undisputed evidence
that the Accent’s roof was more than twice as strong as required by
NHTSA Standard 216.67 The 2002 Accent had a roof strength equal to 3.2
times its curb weight—in excess of the 1.5 times the curb weight the
safety standard applicable in 2002 required—and was even in compliance
with the 3.0 times the curb weight the safety standards required at the
time of trial.68 Defendant also tried to introduce evidence (which the
judge excluded at trial) that the Accent had a “stronger roof design than
approximately 95 percent of vehicles to which it was compared based on
the Standard 216 testing.”69 Defendant’s Accent 2002 was therefore in
compliance with customary codes and standards.70
Concerning the second step, which appears to be a variant of the
“consumer expectations” test,71 Plaintiff argued that although the Accent
may have met NHTSA standards, it was nevertheless not crashworthy.
Plaintiff introduced evidence to show that the “door came open during
the second roll of the accident because of a defect”72 and that “[the lack
of a door] enhanced the amount of roof crush sustained.”73 The court also
found that Plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to allow the jury to
find that the roof was “defective in design.”74 The court stated that a jury
could have agreed with Plaintiff’s expert that the “2002 Accent roof de-
sign [was] defective and unreasonably dangerous because it lack[ed] ade-
quate strength or crush resistance to provide reasonable protection in this
particular low speed rollover.”75 Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s ex-
pert’s “roof-testing knowledge was from static drop tests performed on
vehicles other than a 2002 Hyundai Accent and that such tests were not
66. Brief of Defendants-Petitioners at 4, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., cert.
quashed, No. 32,534 (Dec. 14, 2010).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4–5.
69. Id. at 5.
70. See also text accompanying notes 156–64.
71. See BESSINGER & CADE, supra note 28 (citing Vincer v.Williams All-Alumi- R
num Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975)).
72. Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents at 15, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., cert.
quashed, No. 32,534 (Dec. 14, 2010).
73. Id. at 16.
74. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶¶ 30–34, 149 N.M. 1.
75. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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analogous to the rollover at issue here.”76 In response, the court stated
that Defendant should have “brought this issue to the jury’s attention.”77
The above argument suggests that a reasonable prudent person
would consider the car an unreasonable risk despite being compliant with
NHTSA standards. A conclusion to this effect, however, rests on the un-
derstanding that this was a low-speed rollover crash. But looking at the
undisputed evidence introduced by Defendant, this does not seem to be
the case. According to the court of appeals, both Defendant’s and Plain-
tiff’s experts accepted the fact that the likely speed of the vehicle was
between 32.46 miles per hour and 34.43 miles per hour and that it was
close to Defendant’s own rollover tests that Defendant had conducted on
other 2002 Accents going approximately thirty miles per hour.78 Defen-
dant’s expert testified, however, that this was an “unusually severe acci-
dent [because] the car left the road at 60 mph and rolled 3.5 times.”79 It
appears that the driver reached for her cell phone and lost control of the
car.80 Defendant also indicated in its brief to the supreme court, but not in
its brief to the court of appeals, that it introduced undisputed evidence at
trial that the outcome of a rollover accident is not only based on speed
but upon a “sum total of several factors.”81 These factors included the
“angle of the initial roll, the number of rolls . . . and the nature of the
roll,”82 which may explain why the driver was able to walk away from the
accident, while the accident killed Mr. Baca. Defendant implied that
Plaintiff’s expert did not mimic these characteristics during the “ge-
neric”83 drop tests. The record suggests that Defendant did not “convinc-
ingly” prove,84 during trial and on appeal, that the unusual nature of the
accident, as opposed to a design defect, caused the roof to collapse. In-
stead, Defendant tried to discredit the expertise of Plaintiff’s expert85 or
to suppress his testimony on grounds that it was “too generalized” and
76. Id. ¶ 34.
77. Id.
78. Id. ¶ 19.
79. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 11, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-
NMCA-090, No. 28,240 (2010). It is not clear why the court did not examine Defen-
dant’s assertion that this accident was “unusually severe.”
80. Id. at 3.
81. Brief of Defendants-Petitioners at 9, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., cert.
quashed, No. 32,534 (Dec. 14, 2010).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 8.
84. See infra Part V.B (discussing Defendant’s burden of proof).
85. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 34, 149 N.M. 1.
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“unreliable” to meet the pre-requisites for expert testimony outlined in
State v. Alberico.86
A reasonable, prudent person with “full knowledge of the risk”87
involved with driving a car on a highway could very well conclude that
the 2002 Accent was compliant with NHTSA standards and that the crash
was a freak rollover accident that no one could expect a passenger car to
withstand. That is, a person could conclude that there was no reasonable
way to eliminate or reduce the collapse of the roof in this case without
“impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expen-
sive.”88 This factor seems to favor Defendant, although the evidence does
not point definitively either way.
3. The likelihood of a design defect causing injury and its probable
seriousness, i.e., “risk”
This factor relates to causation. It is unclear why the proof of design
defect incudes it. It is possible that the inclusion of this factor is a vestige
of the risk-benefit test, wherein a “plaintiff need only show that the de-
sign of the product was the proximate cause of the injury, shifting the
burden to the product manufacturer to demonstrate that the benefits of
the particular design outweigh the risks.”89 While this factor addresses
risk, it does not show how the jury should assess the unreasonableness of
that risk. The Committee Commentary of UJI 13-1407 also does not pro-
vide guidance on how to assess likelihood of injury.90
Plaintiff’s expert testified that as a result of the rollover accident,
the roof pillars had deformed inward and downward by as much as 10.9
inches and thereby reduced Mr. Baca’s survival space.91 The court noted
that “Defendant[ ] never argued . . . that the physiological forces from the
accident were so severe that Mr. Baca could not have survived even if the
cabin . . . had preserved adequate survival space.”92 Defendant’s expert
testified, however, that this was an unusually severe accident because the
car left the road at more than 60 miles per hour, rolled three and one half
times, and that the damage to the Accent resulted from approximately
86. Id. ¶¶ 11–14 (explaining that the State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 166, 861
P.2d 192, 202 (1993) “prerequisites for expert testimony are applied somewhat differ-
ently by New Mexico courts than by federal courts applying Daubert[,]” in that expert
testimony is restricted to testimony based on scientific knowledge, and does not in-
clude testimony based on experience or training).
87. See UJI 13-1408 NMRA.
88. See Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 53, 149 N.M. 1 (citing UJI 13-1407).
89. See BESSINGER & CADE, supra note 28. R
90. See infra text accompanying notes 145–55.
91. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 32, 149 N.M. 1.
92. Id. ¶ 43.
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four tons of force.93 The court noted that Defendant “did not present any
testimony that Mr. Baca would necessarily have been rendered uncon-
scious even if the roof of the car had not crushed as much as it did.”94 The
third factor presented an opportunity for Defendant to argue that Plain-
tiff’s death was not caused by a defective design but instead by a combi-
nation of factors that no reasonable alternative design could have
protected Plaintiff from. It appears that Defendant did not adequately
challenge Plaintiff’s proof of causation during trial. Several factors may
cause the death of a passenger during a rollover crash.95 One cannot pre-
sume a design defect from Mr. Baca’s death. The third factor therefore
relates to causation, and it is questionable how it fits with proving design
defect.
4. The obviousness of the danger
The committee commentary for UJI 13-1407 states that one should
examine this factor in view of UJI 13-1412 NMRA and UJI 13-1415
NMRA. UJI 13-1412 states:
In connection with the claim under “products liability,” a product
may present an unreasonable risk of injury even though the risk is
obvious or may be known to the user. An obvious risk of injury is
unacceptable and must be avoided by [product design] [or] [the
adoption of a suitable safety device] where a reasonably prudent
supplier having full knowledge of the risk would expect that the
user will fail to protect [himself] [herself] or others, despite aware-
ness of the danger.96
Further, the use note for UJI 13-1412 states: “[t]his instruction shall be
given where a submissible issue is the adequacy of product design and
defendant contends that the risk of injury associated with the design is
obvious.” The committee commentary for UJI 13-1412 clarifies that obvi-
ousness of a danger “eliminates a duty to warn of that danger (UJI 13-
1415).” It then states, “[i]n the design of a product, a supplier may be
required by ordinary care to consider and guard against an obvious dan-
ger.”97 Finally, it states that “[w]ith increasing frequency, products liabil-
ity cases are predicated upon the supplier’s failure to adopt a plan or
93. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 11, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-
NMCA-090 (No. 28,240).
94. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 43, 149 N.M. 1.
95. See also infra text accompanying notes 145–155.
96. See UJI 13-1407 comm. cmt.; UJI 13-1412 NMRA (emphasis added). See also
UJI 13-1412 use note; UJI 13-1412 comm. cmt.
97. See UJI 13-1412 comm. cmt.
33996-nm
x_44-1 Sheet No. 116 Side B      02/06/2014   10:11:19
33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 116 Side B      02/06/2014   10:11:19
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX106.txt unknown Seq: 16  4-FEB-14 14:06
222 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
design which incorporates features to reduce or eliminate obvious
hazards.”98 Plaintiff did not contend that the risk of injury associated with
the Accent was obvious. Therefore, this factor is not relevant to this case.
5. Common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger
(particularly for established products)99
The committee commentary for UJI 13-1407 states that one should
examine this factor in view of UJI 13-1403 NMRA, UJI 13-1406 NMRA,
and UJI 13-1418 NMRA. The committee commentary for UJI 13-1403
states “[a]s with any negligence action, in products liability cases founded
upon negligence, foreseeability of the risk of injury is an essential ele-
ment and restricts the scope of an actor’s liability.”100 Since this case was
based on a strict products liability claim, UJI 13-1403 is not relevant here.
UJI 13-1406 states:
Under the “products liability” claim, a supplier in the business of
putting a product on the market is liable for harm caused by an
unreasonable risk of injury resulting from a condition of the prod-
uct or from a manner of its use. Such a risk makes the product
defective. This rule applies even though all possible care has been
used by the supplier in putting the product on the market.101
The supreme court chose a “reasonably prudent person standard of ‘un-
reasonable risk of injury,’ rather than the Restatement’s user-oriented
standard of danger ‘to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.’”102 The
instruction therefore has “universal application . . . for strict products lia-
bility [cases] relating to production flaw defects, unsafe design or formu-
lation, warning inadequacies, safety options and products which are
unavoidably unsafe, with a risk of harm not justified by usefulness or de-
98. Id.
99. See UJI 13-1407 comm. cmt.; UJI 13-1403 NMRA.
100. UJI 13-1406 NMRA (emphasis added).
101. See UJI 13-406 NMRA (2009) comm. cmt. (citing Stang v. Hertz Corp., 1972-
NMSC-032, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (S. Ct. 1972)).
102. See id. See also supra Part V.A.2 (describing a variant of the consumer expec-
tations test that is applied from the standpoint of a reasonable prudent person). The
Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions for Civil Cases considers and recommends
proposed amendments to the Uniform Jury Instructions for the Supreme Court’s
consideration.
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sirability of the product.”103 Therefore, UJI 13-1406 forms the foundation
for strict product liability in New Mexico that courts apply through UJI
13-1407.
UJI 13-1418 relates to a supplier’s duty to warn or duty to give di-
rections for use and “is to be given only if there is a jury issue as to the
adequacy of a warning or directions for use communicated by a sup-
plier.”104 Plaintiff here did not assert a breach of Defendant’s duty to
warn, and, therefore, this instruction is not relevant here. Instead, this
factor simply confirms that UJI 13-1407 is the relevant instruction for ex-
amining strict product liability in New Mexico because it is neutral to
both parties.
6. The avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including
the effect of instructions or warnings)
Similar to the fifth factor, the committee commentary for UJI 13-
1407 indicates that one should consider this factor in view of UJI 13-1403,
UJI 13-1406, and UJI 13-1418. In its strict liability claim, Plaintiff did not
raise Defendant’s lack of care by way of instructions and warnings, or the
relevant standard of care. Accordingly, this factor is not relevant to this
case.
7. The ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the
usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive
Bustos stated that this “seventh consideration most directly ad-
dresses what the jury may consider with respect to alternative design, and
this language is included in the actual jury instruction as something the
jury ‘should consider.’”105 The trial judge had instructed the jury to this
effect.106 The seventh risk-benefit factor is examined in detail below.107
In sum, a reasonable person would likely find that factors 1, 4, and 6
are not relevant to this case. The second factor seems to favor Defendant.
The third factor relates to causation and its fit in proving design defect is
questionable. The fifth factor is neutral to both parties. Therefore, the
seventh factor, which relates to proving the presence or absence of an
alternative safer design, is crucial to proving design defect in this case.
Defendant argued that the court must require proof of a reasonable alter-
103. See UJI 13-1406 comm. cmt. See also Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 55, 149 N.M.
1. (explaining that UJI “UJI 13-1407[ ] must be used in every strict products liability
case based upon Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.”).
104. See UJI 13-1418 NMRA comm. cmt.
105. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 54, 149 N.M. 1 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. See infra Part V.B.
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native design without which there could be no design defect liability.108
Additionally, the court stated that New Mexico’s UJI 13-1407 was unlike
the jury instructions that the majority of other United States jurisdictions
use.109 UJI 13-1407, however, covers Defendant’s request because the
court indicated that Plaintiff did offer reasonable alternative design op-
tions to support its case.110 That is, Plaintiff did meet the requirement that
Defendant requested. The court of appeals’ explicit statement to this ef-
fect, preceded by a balancing of these factors during trial, would have
prevented the tortuous play of semantics that occupied the Defendant,
Plaintiff, and the court. The discussion below examines the court’s treat-
ment of reasonable alternative designs in this case.
B. In New Mexico, the plaintiff’s low burden for showing a reasonable
alternative design requires the defendant to “convincingly” demonstrate
that plaintiff’s alternatives are not feasible.
The court of appeals found that Plaintiff did in fact “identif[y] alter-
natives that could have been implemented to improve [the car’s] per-
formance in a rollover.”111 Defendant wanted Plaintiff to show that the
testing of these alternatives in a prototype under simulated conditions
would prove that, “but for a defective design, the Accent’s roof would
have crushed to a maximum of three inches”112 instead of the 10.9 inches
that actually occurred during this accident.113 Brooks, however, rejected
this level of certainty requirement for product liability claims in New
Mexico, stating: “defect giving rise to strict products liability is not mea-
sured by comparison with a prototype.”114 The court in this case agreed
with Brooks: in the absence of a prototype, Plaintiff’s burden to show
alternative designs can be somewhat speculative.
Plaintiff’s expert stated that, based on his experience and inspection
of information provided by Defendant, three alternatives115 could have
improved the strength or crush resistance of the 2002 Accent’s roof and
provided reasonable protection in this low-speed rollover. These alterna-
tives were: (1) filling the hollow A-pillar with structural foam, which
108. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 50, 149 N.M. 1 (emphasis added).
109. Brief of Defendants-Petitioners at 39, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., cert.
quashed, No. 32,534 (Dec. 14, 2010).
110. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 31, 149 N.M. 1.
111. Id. ¶ 57.
112. Id. ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. “[Plaintiff] never attempted to show that those alternative designs would have
been effective in this particular accident.” Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 45, Bus-
tos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090, No. 28,240 (2010).
114. Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 120 N.M.372.
115. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 31, 149 N.M. 1.
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would have increased the structural strength of the roof by 10–20 percent,
(2) otherwise reinforcing the pillars, and (3) using an integrated rollover
cage, which could have “provide[d] adequate rollover protection under
the conditions of this rollover.”116 The court ruled that, based on the ex-
pert’s testimony, the jury “could have found that the Accent’s roof was
defective in that it failed to provide adequate survival space.”117
In this case, it is not clear what exactly one expected of Defendant.
On the one hand, Brooks did not require a comparison with a prototype
that would demonstrate a product defect with some certainty. On the
other hand, Bustos only requires the plaintiff to meet a low standard of
reasonableness to prove that alternate designs were available to defen-
dant. Further, a plaintiff’s expert can demonstrate this reasonableness by
using a patchwork of different pieces of information. The court of appeals
found that it would have been reasonable for the jury to infer from the
totality of the expert’s testimony that Defendant’s use of a rollover cage
would have been feasible in this vehicle.118 The court then noted that the
Defendant did not “demonstrate[ ] how such inferences [on the part of
the jury] would [have been] improper.”119
The court of appeals’ reasoning suggests that the burden of proof
shifts120 to Defendant to convincingly demonstrate, using evidence from
testing or from using prototypes, that Plaintiff’s reasonable alternative
designs were in fact not feasible. The court set the bar much higher for
Defendant. While the court did not require Plaintiff to show certainty as
to the feasibility of alternative designs, it appears that the court required
Defendant to show certainty or close to certainty as to the non-feasibility
of the alternative designs. This seems to be the law in New Mexico. In
effect, Defendant should have demonstrated that a rollover cage would
not have been feasible in the Accent. Defendant failed to carry this bur-
den. In the court’s opinion, Defendant’s strategy was woefully
inadequate.
Instead of demonstrating that the expert’s three alternative designs
were not feasible, Defendant argued that the expert’s testimony was “un-
reliable because it was too generalized and [was] not based on the specific
facts of this case.”121 The court rejected Defendant’s argument by stating
that the expert had “inspected the vehicle involved in the accident four
116. Id. ¶¶ 23, 31.
117. Id. ¶ 33.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. In a manner similar to the risk-utility test of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
where the burden of proof shifts to defendant. See BESSINGER & CADE, supra note 28. R
121. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 11, 149 N.M. 1.
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times,”122 “inspected the bare structural elements in order to assess how
they performed in the crash,”123 “reviewed [Defendant’s] materials on the
vehicle, including pre-production design information, testing protocols
and results,”124 and “reviewed . . . technical data from . . . a rollover test
conducted by [Defendant] on other 2002 Accents similar to that involved
in this case.”125 Although the expert did not “calculate the actual forces at
work in the crash,”126 and based his recommendations for design alterna-
tives in part on “another vehicle that employed an integrated roll cage,”127
the court found that the expert had recommended reasonable alternative
designs.128
In New Mexico, this discrepancy in burden of proof between a plain-
tiff and a defendant in a strict product liability suit is underwritten by
policy considerations. The policy of risk distribution or cost distribution
underpins the principle that “the risk of injury can be insured by the man-
ufacturer and distributed among the public as the cost of doing busi-
ness.”129 The goal is to “minimize the cost of accidents and to consider
who should bear those costs.”130 A defendant in a strict liability suit in
New Mexico must be aware that plaintiff’s proposed alternatives need
only pass a “reasonableness” bar, which then “shifts” the burden to de-
fendant to convincingly prove the non-feasibility of those alternatives.131
This note discusses some implications of this strict liability practice in
New Mexico below.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
New Mexico case law is unclear about where the nexus rests be-
tween law and equity in strict product liability design defect automobile
crash cases. This note calls for systematic application of the unreasonable
risk-of-injury test for the following reasons. First, this test includes some
122. Id. ¶ 18.
123. Id.
124. Id. ¶ 19.
125. Id.
126. Id. ¶ 24.
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 31.
129. Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶ 14, 120 N.M. 372 (citing Escola v. Coco Cola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)).
130. Id. ¶ 15 (citing Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 173,
406 A.2d 140, 151 (1979)).
131. See id. ¶ 22 (“[I]n the interest of fairness, providing relief against the manufac-
turer who—while perhaps innocent of negligence—cast the defective product into the
stream of commerce and profited thereby.”).
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elements of both the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility test.
Bustos confirmed that one could use the risk-benefit factors listed in the
Committee Commentary of UJI 13-1407 to examine strict product liabil-
ity for design defects in New Mexico. By consistent application of this
test, some level of certainty and predictability would attach to the balanc-
ing and weighing of the factors that make up UJI 13-1407. In some other
areas of law and over the course of many years, the law has streamlined
tests that involve balancing factors. For example, the federal circuit courts
have molded and developed the likelihood of confusion test used to ex-
amine trademark infringement claims by assigning different weights and
rules to the eight or nine factors that make up this test.132 To promote
systematic use of UJI 13-1407, juries should be required to make individ-
ual findings on each of the risk-benefit factors using special verdict forms
or other means. This practice would be consistent with the recommenda-
tion that, in strict product liability cases, the jury should collect and care-
fully weigh risk-benefit factors.133 In the absence of this requirement, a
jury could sympathize with, and favor a plaintiff, especially a deceased
young plaintiff, in strict product liability cases.
A suitable amendment to UJI 13-1407 could read as follows:134
An unreasonable risk of injury is a risk which a reasonably pru-
dent person having full knowledge of the risk would find unac-
ceptable. This means that a product does not present an
unreasonable risk of injury simply because it is possible to be
harmed by it.
The design of a product need not necessarily adopt features which
represent the ultimate in safety. You must135examine whether the
product was defective by balancing the following factors:136
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product; (2) the availability
of other and safer products to meet the same need; (3) the likeli-
132. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of The Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1587 (2006).
133. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.
J. 825, 838 (1973).
134. Emphasis added represents my recommended amendments to UJI 13-1407.
The balancing factors have been relocated from the commentary of UJI 13-1407 to
the main body of the proposed instruction.
135. “should” replaced by “must.” See Brief for Products Liability Advisory Coun-
cil, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 11, Bustos v. Hyundai
Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090 (No. 28,240).
136. The inserted new language replaces “consider the ability to eliminate the risk
without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expen-
sive,” because the deleted language is repeated in the seventh factor.
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hood of injury and its probable seriousness, i.e., “risk”137; (4) the
obviousness of the danger; (5) common knowledge and normal
public expectation of the danger (particularly for established prod-
ucts); (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product
(including the effect of instructions or warnings); and (7) the ability
to eliminate the danger [using reasonable alternative designs]138
without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making
it unduly expensive.
Under products liability law, you are not to consider the reasona-
bleness of acts or omissions of the supplier. You are to look at the
product itself and consider only the risks of harm from its condi-
tion or from the manner of its use at the time of the injury. The
question for you is whether the product was defective, even
though the supplier could not have known of such risks at the time
of supplying the product.
The recommended amendments do not deviate from Brooks’ holdings.
Based on existing policy considerations, the burden to demonstrate non-
feasibility of the alternative designs offered by a plaintiff could continue
to fall on a defendant. However, if a court does not require a plaintiff to
demonstrate the feasibility of alternative designs using a prototype then
the same standard should apply to a defendant product manufacturer.
Certain factors may become irrelevant under particular facts and circum-
stances (such as the nature of the product or the maturity of the product).
As noted previously, the weight one should attach to these factors, and
the practical nuances of balancing these factors, would require systematic
application of the instruction during trial and development over time.
Currently, courts use several jury instructions containing ambiguous lan-
guage to explain the application of UJI 13-1407. For example, UJI 13-
1406 just confirms that UJI 13-1407 is the relevant jury instruction for
strict product liability.139 As another example, UJI 13-1403 relates to
product liability claims that sound in negligence theory.140 The courts
should eliminate these ambiguous instructions and incorporate relevant
instructions under the UJI 13-1407’s use note.
137. See supra Part V.A.3. This factor has the appearance of a causation element.
The use note of the amended instruction should clarify that this factor requires a
plaintiff to introduce evidence regarding the likelihood of types of injury, and the
seriousness of injury.
138. The added phrase “using reasonable alternative designs” makes explicit what
was previously implied.
139. See supra Part V.A.5.
140. See supra Part V.A.5.
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Second, to a product manufacturer, this case may suggest that De-
fendant could not have done anything to alter the verdict. A closer review
of the record, however, suggests that Defendant’s strategy, perhaps more
than any design defect in the Accent, was a key factor that influenced the
outcome of the case. Defendant’s attempt to negate the application of
UJI 13-1407 was questionable at best. Defendant sealed its fate when it
attempted to mount a facial challenge to New Mexico’s law but was ill
prepared to show how UJI 13-1407 was fundamentally unfair to its case
and to other product manufacturers as well.141 The court of appeals does
not have authority to change jury instructions,142 and so Defendant was
hoping that the supreme court would hear its appeal. By rejecting Defen-
dant’s appeal, one can assume the supreme court signaled its rejection of
Defendant’s argument and satisfaction with the jury instructions as they
are. Defendant did not demonstrate why the seven-factor test did not
support Plaintiff’s case but instead embarked on an unproductive excur-
sion.143 For example, Defendant did not address the fact that the safer
alternative design elements that the Plaintiff’s expert had proposed, while
technically feasible, were not practical because they would have “seri-
ously made the product unduly expensive.”144 The court stated “it would
have been reasonable for the jury to infer . . . that a roll cage could have
been feasible in the subject vehicle.”145 Further, the court stated: “Defen-
dant[ ] ha[s] not demonstrated how such inferences would be im-
proper.”146 Roll cages, while integrated into some high-end vehicles and
sports utility vehicles such as the Volvo XC-90, are not typically inte-
141. At trial, Defendant wanted a jury instruction that sounded in negligence the-
ory pursuant to the Restatement (Third) of Torts. See Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 50,
149 N.M. 1. But later, Defendant seems to have accepted that defective design can
sound in strict liability, and argued that the proof of a feasible alternative design must
be made mandatory in New Mexico instead of being “one relevant consideration.”
See Brief of Defendants-Petitioners at 24, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., cert. quashed,
No. 32,534 (Dec. 14, 2010).
142. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 55, 149 N.M. 1.
143. Defendant stated: “[r]ather than making this alternative design requirement
explicit, however, New Mexico has so far allowed the practice of ‘letting the lawyers
argue.’” See Brief of Defendants-Petitioners at 44, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., No.
32,534 (Dec. 14, 2010). “But that approach provides little guidance to the jury[ ] and
little or no predictability for potential litigants[ ] as to the standards of conduct appli-
cable under New Mexico law.” Id. “Unless the [c]ourt wishes to see New Mexico tort
law transformed from a fault-based system to what amounts to an insurance system,
the judgment below must be reversed.” Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 45–46,
Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090 (No. 28,240).
144. See UJI 13-1407 comm. cmt. (seventh factor).
145. Bustos, 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 33, 149 N.M. 1.
146. Id.
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grated into in economy passenger cars such as the Accent.147 Further-
more, some studies have shown that fatality in rollover crashes is not
uncommon and have demonstrated that the “actual injuries received by
an occupant in a rollover, are also partially dependent on ‘luck’—e.g., the
exact position of the occupant’s body as the vehicle rolls.”148 In one study,
19 percent of fatal crashes resulted from a rollover;149 in another, 5.7 per-
cent of rollover accidents involving passenger cars resulted in a passen-
ger’s death.150 Further, due to electronic control and other safety systems,
“when seen in terms of rollover-fatalities per million registered vehicles
. . . [f]rom 1998 to 2009, SUV rollover driver fatality rates decreased from
43 per million to 12 [per million]. The rate for car drivers dropped from
21 per million to 13 [per million].”151 The outcome of a rollover accident
therefore is contingent not only on the use of rollover cages and roof-
strength but also on other variables (driver negligence, and safety warn-
ings) that the jury should weigh and balance before concluding that a
manufacturer should be liable for its design.
Finally, Defendant’s amicus suggests that the unreasonable risk of
injury test currently implemented deters businesses from operating in
New Mexico.152 The 2002 Accent had passed NHTSA standards. It had a
roof strength equal to 3.2 times its curb weight—in excess of the 1.5 times
the curb weight requirement of the safety standard applicable in 2002—
and was even in compliance with the 3.0 times the curb weight require-
147. Barry Winfield, Is SUV now short for “Sport-Utility-Volvo”?, Car and Driver
(October 2002), available at http://www.caranddriver.com/reviews/volvo-xc90-first-
drive-review-safety-is-a-priority-page-3 (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
148. George Rechnitzer & John Lane, Rollover Crash Study-Vehicle Design and
Occupant Injuries, Monash University Accident Research Centre-Report #65-1994, at
6 (1994) (available at http://www.monash.edu.au/miri/research/reports/muarc065.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2012)).
149. Id. at 1.
150. See Review of NMVCCS Rollover Variables in Support of Rollover Recon-
struction, DOT HS 811 235, U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (Jan. 2010) (calculated from the data presented in Table
16 showing 10,531 deaths from 184, 271 passenger car accidents. This review post-
dates the trial date of this case, is cited as a representative source of data available,
and analyzed 6,949 roll-over crashes in the U.S. from 2005–2007).
151. Rollover 101: How Rollovers Happen And What You Can Do To Avoid One,
Consumer Reports, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/02/rollover-101/index.
htm (last updated, March 2012). See generally http://www.safercar.gov/Rollover (last
visited Nov. 24, 2012).
152. New Mexico practice breeds the type of legal uncertainty that discourages
businesses from locating in New Mexico. Brief for Association of Commerce and In-
dustry as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 15, Bustos v. Hyundai
Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090, No. 28,240 (2010).
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ment of the standard at the time of trial.153 In Brooks, the court’s reluc-
tance to accept industry standards as conclusive evidence stems from the
Second Circuit’s 1932 ruling in The T.J. Hooper,154 that states: “[a manu-
facturer] may never set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.”155
The Brooks court held that design-defect claims “may be proved without
showing that the manufacturer has violated regulations, codes, or stan-
dards.”156 The court affirmed that UJI 13-408, which states: “[i]ndustry
customs . . . are evidence of the acceptability of the risk, but they are not
conclusive”157 and “should be given in cases involving a claimed design
defect.”158 What amounts to conclusive evidence is left unsaid. Certainly,
automobile industrial practice has come a long way since 1932. Cars are
subject to NHTSA standards; an automobile manufacturer or an associ-
ated lobbying group do not set these standards. How high a burden of
proof did Defendant have to meet? Did the court require Defendant to
show that the car must withstand the effects of what appears to be a freak
accident when the car rolled-off Interstate I-10159 because the driver
reached over to get her cell phone?160 As this note previously discussed, it
appears that the court and jury wanted Defendant to prove that a proto-
type of the car was safe when replicating the rollover accident.161 NHTSA
safety certification was not enough. Was this a reasonable standard for
Defendant? Resolving these questions requires the courts to establish the
scope and implementation of UJI 13-1407. Until then, a defendant prod-
uct manufacturer or supplier in a New Mexico product liability case must
be prepared to present its case, assuming the burden of proof under a
standard that is well north of preponderance of the evidence.
153. Brief of Defendants-Petitioners at 4–5, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., cert.
quashed, No. 32,534 (Dec. 14, 2010).
154. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)
155. Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶ 40, 120 N.M.372 (citing The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d
737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)).
156. Id. ¶ 1.
157. See supra Part V.A.2.
158. Brooks, 1995-NMSC-043, ¶ 41, 120 N.M.372.
159. According to Defendant’s expert, this was an unusually severe accident be-
cause the car left the road at sixty miles per hour and rolled 3.5 times. See Brief of
Defendants-Petitioners at 12, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., cert. quashed, No. 32,534
(Dec. 14, 2010).
160. Brief of Defendants-Petitioners at 3, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., cert.
quashed, No. 32,534 (Dec. 14, 2010).
161. See supra Part V.B.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this case, Defendant mounted what appears to be a facial chal-
lenge against New Mexico’s UJI 13-407. As UJI 13-1407 is flexible
enough to include any rational theory that is suitable for any product, the
supreme court’s action in quashing certiorari was appropriate. Nonethe-
less, UJI 13-1407’s application is unclear. In automobile crash cases, it is
unlikely that a plaintiff will be successful without proving that a safer
design alternative was available.162 It appears, however, that a plaintiff
could simply use experts to postulate reasonable design alternatives; the
jury would view a defendant’s failure to incorporate these features in the
car as a design defect. In contrast, due to burden shifting, a defendant has
to carry a heavy burden to prove that a plaintiff’s proposed alternative
designs are not feasible. That is, a defendant must prove that it is not
possible to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the useful-
ness of the product or making it unduly expensive. An amicus brief sup-
porting Defendant’s arguments asserts that the legal practice in New
Mexico breeds the type of legal uncertainty that discourages businesses
from locating their businesses in the State.163 A recent study also lends
support to this assertion, ranking New Mexico 45th for jury fairness in the
United States and 44th for overall tort and contract litigation.164 This case
does not help to debunk this assertion. Even those who question the ac-
curacy or relevancy of the above survey must agree that New Mexico law
needs clarity in applying UJI 13-1407 to streamline strict product liability
litigation in New Mexico.
162. This statement is based on the analysis of this case, and is expected to extend
to other automobile crash cases. The balancing of these risk-benefit factors during a
strict products liability suit that arises from defects in other products, for example,
new or dangerous products and chemicals, may not require a showing of reasonable
alternate designs.
163. Brief for Association of Commerce and Industry as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Defendant-Appellant at 15, Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090, No.
28,240 (2010).
164. U.S. Chamber Institute of Legal Reform: 2012 State Liability Systems Survey
on Lawsuit Climate (Sept. 2012). Survey summary can be downloaded from http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). See also Dennis
Domrzalski, US Chamber Ranks NM Low on Biz Legal Climate, Albuquerque Busi-
ness First (Sep. 10, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/news/2012/09/10/
us-chamber-ranks-nm-low-on-biz-legal.html
